Recently there were many quantum protocols devoted to solve the millionaire problem and private comparison problem by adding a semi-honest third party. They all require complicated quantum methods, while still leak a non-trivial amount of information to at least one of the parties. But it will be shown here that once the third party is introduced, there are very simple protocols which require quantum key distribution as the only quantum resource, and the amount of information leaked can be made arbitrarily small. Furthermore, even a dishonest third party cannot spoil the protocols. Thus our solutions surpass all existing protocols on both feasibility and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The millionaire problem [1] was originally a two-party secure computation problem, in which two millionaires, Alice and Bob, want to know which of them is richer without revealing their actual wealth. It is analogous to a more general problem whose goal is to compare two numbers a and b, without revealing any extra information on their values other than what can be inferred from the comparison result. There is also a variation called the socialist millionaire problem [2] , in which Alice and Bob want to determine if their wealth a and b are equal, without disclosing any extra information on the values of a and b to each other. As typical examples of secure multi-party computations, these problems play essential roles in cryptography. They have many applications in ecommerce and data mining where people need to compare numbers which are confidential.
Nevertheless, the original solution [1] to the problems needs to rely on oblivious transfer [3] , which is hard to achieve unconditional security even in quantum cryptography [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Therefore, people considered a relaxed setting of the problems which involves an additional semihonest third party, generally called Trent (or TP). Trent communicates with Alice and Bob separately. He is regarded as semi-honest because, on one hand, they study only the case where he executes the protocol faithfully, and loyally keeps the data he exchanges with one party secret from the other. That is, he will not try to spoil the protocol, nor he will help either Alice or Bob to cheat. On the other hand, he is not fully trustable as he may attempt to learn the values of a and b or the comparison result, by methods such as eavesdropping or intercepting the classical and quantum channels between the other two parties, or faking the quantum states which look authentic to Alice and Bob while entangled with his ancillary systems that can provide him additional informations, etc.
Under this scenario, the problems become a three- * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn party cryptography, so that the existing impossibility proofs [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] on two-party secure computations do not necessarily apply. Therefore, many quantum protocols were proposed. Jia et al. [9] gave a solution to the millionaire problem, while the others [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] studied the socialist millionaire problem under the name "quantum private comparison" (QPC). In this paper, however, we will show that once the third party is included, there exists simple solutions to the problems which are basically classical protocols with the assistance of quantum key distribution (QKD) [23] . On the contrary, all previous protocols for the millionaire problem and QPC require a much greater amount of quantum resources, such as entanglement, joint measurements, quantum memory, decoy states, etc. Therefore they are all inferior in feasibility and simplicity.
Moreover, our protocols have two security advantages over the others. First, we will show that all previous protocols [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] inevitably leak a non-trivial amount of information to Trent or both Alice and Bob, while in our protocols this can be avoided. Secondly, a dishonest Trent can spoil many of the previous protocols [9, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . That is, he can mislead Alice and Bob to wrong results even though it brings no advantage to himself. But in our protocol such a dishonest behavior can be detected with a probability that can be made arbitrarily close to 100%. Thus the only constraint on Trent in our protocols is that he should not cheat together with either Alice or Bob to steal the secret data of the other party. Other than that, Trent can be fully distrustful.
In the next section, we will propose our simple protocol for the millionaire problem, and prove its security. Then we will show in section III how to adapt the protocol for the QPC task. A detailed comparison on the feasibility and security of our proposal and previous protocols will be provided in section IV.
II. SIMPLE PROTOCOL FOR THE MILLIONAIRE PROBLEM
Suppose that Alice has a secret number a, and Bob has a secret number b. Like all previous works [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] on the subject, in this paper we only consider the case where Alice and Bob will not try to spoil the protocol. That is, they are willing to help each other to calculate the correct comparison result between a and b honestly, without trying to input a wrong value of the secret number. The only cheating that we need to take care of is that they may attempt to learn extra information on the value of the secret number of the other party, other than what the comparison result naturally implies. Also, the third party Trent will not help either Alice or Bob to cheat.
When dealing with the original millionaire problem, we also assume that the case a = b will never happen. Otherwise the comparison result will inevitably reveal the values of a and b to both parties, so that it will be impossible to reach the original goal of the millionaire problem, which requires the values to remain unrevealed. Note that the previous protocol [9] did not cover this case either.
A. The basic protocol
For easy understanding, we first consider the case where Trent will not try to spoil the protocol. To find out which one of a and b is larger with the help of Trent, Alice and Bob can use the following protocol.
Protocol P0:
(1) Alice and Bob share two random numbers c and λ (λ = 0) through QKD. There is no restriction on the selection range of c and λ as long as they are both real numbers. Their order of magnitude does not need to match that of a and b. They can be either positive or negative, and |λ| can be either larger or smaller than 1. Of course, from a practical point of view, Alice and Bob can limit c and λ to a finite range of rational numbers with a certain precision, so that they can be determined efficiently through QKD. But it is important to keep these range and precision secret from Trent, in order to minimize the information on a and b leaked to Trent.
(2) Alice calculates
and sends α to Trent through QKD. (3) Bob calculates
and sends β to Trent through QKD. (4) Trent calculates
and sets R = 0 (R = 1) if D > 0 (D < 0). Then he announces R to both Alice and Bob publicly. Note that any information (including language, images, etc.) can be encoded digitally, and then presented as binary strings and transferred via QKD, so that the parties can virtually "talk" anything with QKD. Therefore in the above protocol, a, b, c and λ are not limited to bits nor integers, and do not have to be written directly in binary representations and then mapped into quantum operations bit by bit like they did in previous protocols [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . If Alice and Bob want to compare binary strings bit by bit [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , or to compare many pairs of large numbers [9] , they can simply repeat our protocol many times. Note that if both a and b are single bits, then the comparison result will make Alice and Bob easily deduce the secret number of each other. But this situation is inevitable by nature of the millionaire problem and QPC, and also exists in all previous protocols [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] .
The correctness of the protocol can easily be verified. By combining equations (1) - (3), we have
R actually represents the sign of D, (−1) R λ will have the same sign as that of a−b, and thus indicates which one of a and b is larger.
B. The security proof
A distinct merit of our protocol is that other than using QKD to protect the communications between the participants, no more quantum method is involved. The rest parts of the protocol are completely classical. Therefore, given that QKD is unconditionally secure, the security proof of the protocol is simple elementary mathematics.
From Trent's point of view, since the information exchanged between Alice and Bob is secured by QKD, all the information Trent obtained in the protocol is merely the values of α and β, and the fact that they satisfy the relationship described in equations (1) and (2) . The values of a, b, c and λ are not available directly to him. Since two equations are insufficient for determining four unknown variates, Trent will find that there could be infinite solutions for a and b so that he cannot know which one is larger.
In fact, suppose that there are u, v, c 0 and λ 0 satisfying
and
then it can be verified that they also satisfy
That is, no matter Alice's and Bob's choices satisfy a = u,
, Trent will receive the same α and β.
Therefore, a > b and a < b will both make sense to Trent so that he cannot tell which one is the actual comparison result. Also, as |λ| can be either larger or smaller than 1, the value of D = α − β will not manifest the order of magnitude of |a − b|. The existence of c further prevents Trent from getting information on |a/b| by calculating α/β. Thus the protocol is unconditionally secure against Trent. From Alice's point of view, since the information exchanged between Bob and Trent is secured by QKD, she cannot know β. Consequently, besides her own a, all the information she obtained in the protocol is merely the values of c, λ and R. Here c and λ are randomly chosen by her and Bob, which contain no information about b. Meanwhile, R carries 1 bit of information only. According to information theory, this amount is insufficient to determine b as long as the number of possible values of b is more than 3. Therefore the protocol is also unconditionally secure against Alice. The security against Bob can be proven similarly.
C. The complete protocol
Now let us deal with the case where Trent tries to spoil the protocol, i.e., he wants to mislead Alice and Bob to a wrong result of the comparison. In the above Protocol P0, this can be done by announcing a wrong value of R in step (4) . That is, when Trent finds R = 0 (R = 1), he announces R = 1 (R = 0) instead. Consequently, Alice and Bob will both obtain a wrong result on the relationship between a and b, without knowing that Trent has played the trick. Note that most previous protocols [9, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] have the same problem too. But here we can avoid this cheating by extending Protocol P0 into the following complete protocol for the millionaire problem.
Protocol P1: (i) Let a and b denote Alice's and Bob's secret numbers, respectively, that they want to compare. They decide and share a large integer n and an index i 0 ∈ [1, n] through QKD, and keep them secret from Trent.
(ii) Alice and Bob choose n pairs of numbers a i and b i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) in the following way. For i = i 0 , Alice takes a i = a and Bob takes b i = b. For all other i's, they take a i and b i as two numbers that are known to each other but kept secret from Trent, e.g., for simplicity Alice can always takes a i = 2 and Bob takes b i = 1.
(iii) For i = 1 to n, Alice and Bob compare a i and b i with the help of Trent using Protocol P0, each time with a different set of the parameters c and λ. That is:
(iii-1) Alice and Bob share two random numbers c i and λ i (λ i = 0) through QKD.
(iii-2) Alice calculates
and sends α i to Trent through QKD.
(iii-3) Bob calculates
and sends β i to Trent through QKD.
(iii-4) Trent calculates
and sets
Ri λ i > 0. Whenever a mismatched value of R i is found, they know that Trent is cheating.
We can see that Protocol P1 is simply repeating Protocol P0 for n runs, with each run comparing a different pair of a i and b i . In the i 0 -th run they compare the values of a and b that they are really interested, while in the other n − 1 runs both a i and b i are known to them. Therefore, among all the R i 's (i = 1, ..., n) Trent announced, n − 1 of them will be checked in step (v). If Trent tries to spoil the protocol by announcing wrong values of R i 's in more than one run, he will be caught in step (v) with probability 100%. On the other hand, since Trent does not know i 0 , if he announces a wrong value of R i in merely one single run of Protocol P0, there will only be a probability 1/n that the run he chooses is exactly the i 0 -th run. As a consequence, by increasing n, the probability for Trent to spoil the protocol without being detected can be made arbitrarily small.
III. THE QUANTUM PRIVATE COMPARISON PROTOCOL
When applying Protocol P0 directly for the socialist millionaire problem, a.k.a. quantum private comparison (QPC), there will be a security loophole. That is, Trent can always know the comparison result (a = b or a = b) by checking whether there is D = 0. Note that this is also the case in the protocols proposed in Refs. [13-17, 20, 21] . But it is surely better if the loophole can be avoided. Here we show that this goal can indeed be achieved by slightly modifying our above Protocol P1, as described below.
Protocol P2: (I) Let a and b denote Alice's and Bob's secret numbers, respectively, that they want to compare. They decide and share two large integers m, n (m < n) and a set of indices S = {i 0 , i 1 , i 2 , ..., i m } through QKD, and keep them secret from Trent. Here, each i j in S is a randomly chosen integer within the range [ (III-2) Alice calculates
(III-3) Bob calculates
(III-4) Trent announces publicly to Alice and Bob whether α i = β i or not.
(IV) Alice and Bob will both know whether a = b or not according to Trent's announced result on α i0 and β i0 in the i 0 -th run of step (III-4).
(V) The security check: For each i = i 0 , Alice and Bob check whether Trent's announced result always matches their a i , b i . That is, Trent's announcement should always be α i = β i for ∀i ∈ {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i m }, or α i = β i for ∀i / ∈ S. Otherwise he is cheating.
The key idea of this protocol is: Alice and Bob compare many pairs of a i and b i , most of which (except a i0 and b i0 ) have nothing to do with their actual secret numbers a and b. The purpose of introducing these extra pairs is merely to confuse Trent.
The security of the protocol is also obvious. Note that unlike step (4) of the original Protocol P0, here in step (III-4) Trent merely announces whether α i and β i are equal or not, without announcing which one is larger. Therefore in the case a = b, Alice and Bob cannot deduce whether a > b or a < b like they did in step (5) of P0, so that no further information on a and b is leaked to them. From Trent's point of view, no matter a = b or a = b, he will find α i = β i (i.e., a i = b i ) in some runs of step (III-4). He has no idea whether these runs include a and b or not, as the values of i 0 and m are protected by the QKD process between Alice and Bob. Given that QKD is unconditionally secure, we achieve the goal that the final comparison between a and b is kept secret from Trent. Again, no other quantum methods are required besides QKD.
From the similarity between Protocols P1 and P2, we can easily see that P2 can also prevent Trent from spoiling the protocol for the same reason in section II C.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN EXISTING PROTOCOLS A. Feasibility comparison
We summarized the comparison on the technical requirement of our above proposal and previous protocols in Table I . Note that only the one in Ref. [9] and our Protocol P1 deal with the original millionaire problem, i.e., finding the larger one among a and b. The rest (including our Protocol P2) are all QPC protocols, which only compare whether a and b (or X and Y in Refs. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [18] [19] [20] [21] , S A and S B in Ref. [22] ) are equal, without judging which one is larger. Also, Ref. [12] pointed out that the original protocol in Refs. [10, 11] is insecure, and proposed a corresponding solution. Thus we treated Refs. [10] [11] [12] as one protocol in Table I . Similarly, Ref. [15] pointed out the security loopholes of the protocol in Ref. [14] , and suggested two improvements, with one of them making use of the decoy state method. Thus we treated Refs. [14, 15] as one protocol in Table I , and listed "decoy states" as "optional". On the other hand, Ref. [17] commented on the security problem of the protocol in Ref. [16] , and proposed a modification which no longer requires decoy states as Ref. [16] did. Thus we listed them separately in the table.
As we can see, all previous protocols [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] require much more quantum resources than ours. First, quantum memory (at least short-term one) is required in all these protocols, as there are always some parts of the quantum states which cannot be measured immediately once they are received, because the participants cannot determine the measurement basis or the location of the states used for the security checks, until they receive some necessary announcement from other parties. Secondly, most of them (except those in Refs. [13, 21, 22] ) have to rely on quantum entanglement. To compare two numbers a and b satisfying 1 < a, b < N , the protocol in Ref. [9] even requires the use of 2N -level entangled states. Thirdly, some protocols [9-12, 19, 20] require the use of joint measurements on multi-particle states. All these technical requirements seriously lower the feasibility of the protocols. Furthermore, the decoy state method is sometimes adopted [9-12, 15, 16, 20] , which requires a large amount of quantum transmission and thus reduces the efficiency of the protocols. Even so, some proposals [9] [10] [11] [12] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] still involve QKD as parts of the protocols.
On the contrary, in our protocols, other than using QKD to transmit classical information, no more quantum states and operations are required. Since there exists QKD protocol [23] in which entanglement, joint measurements and quantum memory are not necessary, our protocols are much easier to be implemented than all previous proposals. Table II shows the comparison on the security of all protocols. As we elaborated in the above sections, our Protocols P1 and P2 manage to meet the security requirements of the original millionaire problem and QPC, respectively. Alice and Bob know nothing about the secret data of the other party, except what can be inferred from the comparison result. Trent does not know the comparison result at all. Both P1 and P2 can also prevent a dishonest Trent from spoiling the protocol.
On the contrary, spoiling the protocol can be done in many previous proposals [9, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , because Trent can simply lie in the final stage. But more importantly, even though all previous protocols [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] can prevent Trent from knowing the exact values of a and b, they still leak extra information to either Trent or Alice and Bob. In the protocol for the millionaire problem in Ref. [9] , Trent always knows |a − b|, while the QPC protocols in Refs. [13-17, 20, 21] have the problem that Trent knows whether a = b or not, as it was clearly shown in the final steps of these protocols. The rest QPC protocols [10-12, 18, 19, 22] is secure against Trent, but besides the comparison result (a = b or a = b), Alice and Bob will still obtain an extra amount of information on a and b, as elaborated below.
In the QPC protocol in Refs. [10] [11] [12] , Alice and Bob first express a and b in binary representations as
1} for all i's), respectively, then they randomly pick i = i 1 , i 2 , ... and compare each pair of the bits a (i) and b (i) turn out to be equal then they know that a = b. But once they find a difference pair (e.g., a
) which indicates that a = b, they should immediately abort the procedure without further comparing the rest a (i) 's and b (i) 's. In this case, only the first few compared bits of a and b are known to be a
. This is insufficient to determine the exact values of a and b. However, Bob (Alice) will know the exact values of the d bits of a (b) that are already compared, i.e., they both gain d (d ≥ 1) bits of information about a and b. Since d > 1 occurs with a non-vanishing probability, the average amount of information gained will be larger than, and unequal to 1 bit. Note that in Refs. [10] [11] [12] , Alice's and Bob's actual secret numbers that they want to compare are X and Y , respectively, while a = H(X) and b = H(Y ) are their corresponding hash values, where H is a secret hash function they share beforehand. Nevertheless, a good hash function useful for QPC has to be a 1-to-1 mapping between X and a (Y and b), otherwise there could be the case where X = Y while the QPC protocol outputs a = b. Therefore, knowing d bits of a (b) means that the possible choices of the value of X (Y ) will be limited to those whose hash values contain the bits
That is, there are also d bits of mutual information about X (Y ) which become known to Bob (Alice). The use of the hash function merely changes the type of the information leaked, while the amount of this information remains the same.
Similarly, in the protocol in Ref. [22] Alice and Bob also compare the hash values of their secret numbers bit by bit. Therefore, for the same reason, when they know that their secret numbers are unequal, there were already many bits of the hash values become known to both of them, so that a nontrivial amount of mutual information is leaked.
The protocols in Refs. [18, 19] leak extra information to Alice and Bob too. After calculating R in equation (15) of Ref. [18] or equation (9) of Ref. [19] , if R = 0, Alice and Bob will not only know that X = Y , but also know that the number of different bits in the binary representation of X and Y is exactly R. Therefore, the number of the possible choices of the value of Y (X) will Comparison on the security of our protocols P1, P2 and existing millionaire problem and QPC protocols [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . All the blank spaces mean "no". Thus we see that all previous protocols [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] leak extra information to the parties. Our P1 and P2 win handsdown in this category as there is no information leaked.
V. SUMMARY
Thus we show that with the presence of a third party, the millionaire problem and QPC can be solved with protocols which require QKD as the only quantum resource. There is no need for entanglement, joint measurements, quantum memory, etc.. As QKD is already welldeveloped experimentally, our protocols are fully feasible with currently available technology.
Moreover, all previous protocols leak extra informations to at least one of the party. Most of them can also be spoiled by a dishonest third party. Our protocols manage to fix all these security problems.
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